diff --git a/src/SUMMARY.md b/src/SUMMARY.md
index 7f03a949a0b..b503bf8c6d9 100644
--- a/src/SUMMARY.md
+++ b/src/SUMMARY.md
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
   - [Defi/AMM Hook Precision](blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/defi-amm-hook-precision.md)
   - [Defi Amm Virtual Balance Cache Exploitation](blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/defi-amm-virtual-balance-cache-exploitation.md)
   - [Mutation Testing With Slither](blockchain/smart-contract-security/mutation-testing-with-slither.md)
+  - [Erc 4337 Smart Account Security Pitfalls](blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/erc-4337-smart-account-security-pitfalls.md)
   - [Value Centric Web3 Red Teaming](blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/value-centric-web3-red-teaming.md)
   - [Web3 Signing Workflow Compromise Safe Delegatecall Proxy Takeover](blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/web3-signing-workflow-compromise-safe-delegatecall-proxy-takeover.md)
 - [Lua Sandbox Escape](generic-methodologies-and-resources/lua/bypass-lua-sandboxes/README.md)
diff --git a/src/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/README.md b/src/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/README.md
index 0016a497a23..d3625c3480e 100644
--- a/src/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/README.md
+++ b/src/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/README.md
@@ -194,6 +194,14 @@ value-centric-web3-red-teaming.md
 web3-signing-workflow-compromise-safe-delegatecall-proxy-takeover.md
 {{#endref}}
 
+## Account Abstraction (ERC-4337)
+
+- Common smart-account failure modes include bypassing `EntryPoint` access control, unsigned gas fields, stateful validation, ERC-1271 replay, and fee-drain via revert-after-validation.
+
+{{#ref}}
+erc-4337-smart-account-security-pitfalls.md
+{{#endref}}
+
 ## Smart Contract Security
 
 - Mutation testing to find blind spots in test suites:
@@ -228,4 +236,3 @@ defi-amm-virtual-balance-cache-exploitation.md
 {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
 
 
-
diff --git a/src/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/erc-4337-smart-account-security-pitfalls.md b/src/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/erc-4337-smart-account-security-pitfalls.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# ERC-4337 Smart Account Security Pitfalls
+
+{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+
+ERC-4337 account abstraction turns wallets into programmable systems. The core flow is **validate-then-execute** across a whole bundle: the `EntryPoint` validates every `UserOperation` before executing any of them. This ordering creates non-obvious attack surface when validation is permissive or stateful.
+
+## 1) Direct-call bypass of privileged functions
+Any externally callable `execute` (or fund-moving) function that is not restricted to `EntryPoint` (or a vetted executor module) can be called directly to drain the account.
+
+```solidity
+function execute(address target, uint256 value, bytes calldata data) external {
+    (bool ok,) = target.call{value: value}(data);
+    require(ok, "exec failed");
+}
+```
+
+Safe pattern: restrict to `EntryPoint`, and use `msg.sender == address(this)` for admin/self-management flows (module install, validator changes, upgrades).
+
+```solidity
+address public immutable entryPoint;
+
+function execute(address target, uint256 value, bytes calldata data) external {
+    require(msg.sender == entryPoint, "not entryPoint");
+    (bool ok,) = target.call{value: value}(data);
+    require(ok, "exec failed");
+}
+```
+
+## 2) Unsigned or unchecked gas fields -> fee drain
+If signature validation only covers intent (`callData`) but not gas-related fields, a bundler or frontrunner can inflate fees and drain ETH. The signed payload must bind at least:
+
+- `preVerificationGas`
+- `verificationGasLimit`
+- `callGasLimit`
+- `maxFeePerGas`
+- `maxPriorityFeePerGas`
+
+Defensive pattern: use the `EntryPoint`-provided `userOpHash` (which includes gas fields) and/or strictly cap each field.
+
+```solidity
+function validateUserOp(UserOperation calldata op, bytes32 userOpHash, uint256)
+    external
+    returns (uint256)
+{
+    require(_isApprovedCall(userOpHash, op.signature), "bad sig");
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+
+## 3) Stateful validation clobbering (bundle semantics)
+Because all validations run before any execution, storing validation results in contract state is unsafe. Another op in the same bundle can overwrite it, causing your execution to use attacker-influenced state.
+
+Avoid writing storage in `validateUserOp`. If unavoidable, key temporary data by `userOpHash` and delete it deterministically after use (prefer stateless validation).
+
+## 4) ERC-1271 replay across accounts/chains (missing domain separation)
+`isValidSignature(bytes32 hash, bytes sig)` must bind signatures to **this contract** and **this chain**. Recovering over a raw hash lets signatures replay across accounts or chains.
+
+Use EIP-712 typed data (domain includes `verifyingContract` and `chainId`) and return the exact ERC-1271 magic value `0x1626ba7e` on success.
+
+## 5) Reverts do not refund after validation
+Once `validateUserOp` succeeds, fees are committed even if execution later reverts. Attackers can repeatedly submit ops that will fail and still collect fees from the account.
+
+For paymasters, paying from a shared pool in `validateUserOp` and charging users in `postOp` is fragile because `postOp` can revert without undoing the payment. Secure funds during validation (per-user escrow/deposit), and keep `postOp` minimal and non-reverting.
+
+## 6) ERC-7702 initialization frontrun
+ERC-7702 lets an EOA run smart-account code for a single tx. If initialization is externally callable, a frontrunner can set themselves as owner.
+
+Mitigation: allow initialization only on **self-call** and only once.
+
+```solidity
+function initialize(address newOwner) external {
+    require(msg.sender == address(this), "init: only self");
+    require(owner == address(0), "already inited");
+    owner = newOwner;
+}
+```
+
+## Quick pre-merge checks
+- Validate signatures using `EntryPoint`'s `userOpHash` (binds gas fields).
+- Restrict privileged functions to `EntryPoint` and/or `address(this)` as appropriate.
+- Keep `validateUserOp` stateless.
+- Enforce EIP-712 domain separation for ERC-1271 and return `0x1626ba7e` on success.
+- Keep `postOp` minimal, bounded, and non-reverting; secure fees during validation.
+- For ERC-7702, allow init only on self-call and only once.
+
+## References
+
+- [https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/03/11/six-mistakes-in-erc-4337-smart-accounts/](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/03/11/six-mistakes-in-erc-4337-smart-accounts/)
+
+{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}